Why Does Alston Distort My Views Rather than Discuss Them?
Since the beginning of my academic career as a lecturer in constitutional law at the universities of Hamburg and Heidelberg in the early 1970s, I have emphasized that the core of human rights
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Editors Note: The Editors of the EJIL welcomed the request of Professor Petersmann to publish a rejoinder to the comment by Philip Alston and also welcomed his wish to have the rejoinder published in the same issue as the comment. This, however, limited both the time and space available to Profesor Petersmann to prepare his rejoinder. The entire PetersmannAlston exchange will be posted on the website (www.ejil.org), including the longer version of Professor Petersmann's paper to which he makes reference in his rejoinder. Both authors have been invited, should they wish, to amplify their comments on the website. Alston likewise refuses to test or falsify the vast empirical evidence which indicates that the economic welfare of most countries, and the consumer welfare of their citizens, are clearly related to their constitutional guarantees of freedom, property rights and other human rights. See Petersmann, supra note 1, at n. 76.
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Why Does Alston Fail to Discuss Our Different Normative Premises?
Alston neither identifies nor discusses the three normative differences between our human rights conceptions:
1. My interpretation of human liberty rights aims not only at protecting maximum equal freedom, subject to democratic legislation, in all areas of personal self-development (e.g., also
including individual production and consumption of essential goods, services and income) and across frontiers (i.e., challenging welfare-reducing border discrimination against foreign goods, services and persons). Alston limits Kant's 'categorical imperative' to its 'universal law component'; the additional objectives of Kant's moral imperative referred to in my article -i.e., protection of human dignity and personal self-government by treating human beings as legal subjects rather than as mere objects, and by accepting 'universalizable personal freedom' as an end in itself -prompt me to argue for constitutional liberty rights as justiciable individual rights which courts should also protect in transnational relations as individual rights (e.g., to import and export essential goods and services subject to democratic legislation, balancing this freedom with the protection of other human rights). Conferring equal individual rights enables a higher degree of legal autonomy, empowerment and responsibility of individuals, and a more decentralized 'self-enforcing constitution', than does a paternalistic reliance on authoritarian regulation of personal freedom without legal and judicial protection of individual rights (as in many foreign policy areas). The experience with constitutional and judicial protection of every individual's 'right to free development of his personality', pursuant to Article 2 of the German Basic Law, confirms that such a broad constitutional and judicial protection of personal freedom offers individuals important procedural and substantive legal safeguards without unduly limiting the regulatory discretion of democratic legislatures and democratic governments.
2.
My focus on the 'indivisibility' and 'inalienable nature' of core human rights reduces the dangers of a 'positivist' reliance on separate 'civil', 'political', 'economic', 'social' and 'cultural' human rights that have been conceded by governments at particular times in particular human rights instruments, such as the risk of leaving non-enumerated 'inalienable' human rights without legal protection and curtailing human personality by artificial legal distinctions. Treating separate human rights treaties as deriving from one 'inalienable human rights constitution' better protects the diversity and holistic nature of human personality and helps overcome partial human rights perspectives, such as Alston's refusal to protect 'normative individualism' and human rights in 'economic markets' no less than in 'political markets'. Human liberty rights, property rights, non-discrimination rights, social rights, procedural and democratic rights can be protected more effectively if they are understood as parts of a constitutional law that dynamically evolves, in particular national and international contexts, in response to new human rights preferences and challenges (e.g., as formulated in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights).
3 Human rights protect individual and democratic diversity (e.g., human dignity in the sense of moral and rational autonomy) and, in a world of scarce resources, inevitably give rise to competition. The resulting conflicts of interest -for instance, between utility-maximizing producers and consumers in economic markets, and among citizens and self-interested politicians in political markets -create human rights problems which cannot be understood without taking into account 'market failures' as well as 'government failures'. The welfareincreasing effects of economic and political competition (e.g., as a spontaneous information mechanism, allocation-, coordination-and sanctioning-mechanisms, 'voice' and 'exit options'
vis-à-vis abuses of power) are not gifts of nature. They depend on the protection of human rights through a 'limiting constitution' and an 'enabling constitution' (e.g., enabling a collective supply of public goods) in all areas of personal self-development. Hence, an 'economic constitution' is no less necessary than a 'political constitution'. Alston's preference for promoting human rights through 'benevolent governments' rests on authoritarian premises and a pretence of knowledge often dispersed among individuals and unknown to centralized bureaucracies. My proposals for empowering individuals pursue the same human rights values through decentralized and more complex 'market governance mechanisms' which treat citizens as legal subjects rather than mere objects. My emphasis on the instrumental functions of human rights (e.g., as incentives for rendering citizens not only 'better democrats' but also 'better economic actors') pursues the same human rights objective of a life of dignity and personal self-government.
Conclusion
Alston's Comment offers polemics rather than constructive criticism. Human rights must be constitutionally protected in economic markets no less than in political markets. Human rights specialists who neglect the constitutive function of human rights for welfare-creation, as well as the need for competitive markets and efficient policy instruments for reducing unnecessary poverty, risk undermining personal self-development and human rights.
